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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
plaintiffs-appellants Oracle International Corporation, Oracle Systems 
Corporation, Oracle USA Inc., Oracle EMEA Limited, J.D. Edwards Europe 
Limited, and Siebel Systems, Inc. state that Oracle Corporation wholly owns each 
of them, either directly or through one or more of its privately-held wholly owned 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this case, plaintiffs-appellants Oracle International Corporation, Oracle 
USA Inc., and Siebel Systems, Inc. (collectively, “Oracle”) obtained a $1.3 billion 
jury verdict against defendants-appellees SAP AG, SAP America Inc., 
TomorrowNow Inc. (“TN”; and collectively, “SAP”) for an admitted, three-year-
long campaign of copyright infringement built upon millions of illegal downloads 
from Oracle’s password-protected computer systems.   
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Hamilton, J.) 
then issued post-trial orders that set aside that verdict, granted SAP judgment as a 
matter of law on any hypothetical license measure of actual damages, granted SAP 
a new trial if Oracle rejected a $272 million remittitur, and limited any such new 
trial to lost profits and infringer’s profits as Oracle’s sole remedy.  In so doing, the 
district court rejected the jury’s findings that Oracle had demonstrated that $1.3 
billion represented the fair market value that the parties would have agreed upon 
had they bargained for a license authorizing SAP’s infringing use, and that this 
valuation was a better measure of Oracle’s damages than lost profits and/or 
infringer’s profits.   
Those post-trial rulings were in error.  The value of a hypothetical license is 
a long-accepted measure of actual damages under the Copyright Act where, as 
here, it is based on objective evidence.  Contrary to the district court’s post-trial 
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orders, the availability of such damages does not depend on a showing of actual 
willingness to license or comparable “benchmark” licenses.  And Oracle’s 
evidence of such damages here, including SAP’s own recorded projections of the 
value of the infringed material at the time of the infringement, was both objective 
and overwhelming.  The jury’s $1.3 billion award was therefore reasonable, 
especially viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and drawing 
all reasonable inferences in Oracle’s favor, and the district court should not have 
substituted its view of that evidence for that of the jury. 
As the parties prepared for a second trial, the district court again erred in 
issuing a series of rulings improperly limiting the evidence Oracle could present, 
leading Oracle to agree with SAP to stipulate to a final judgment in the amount of 
$306 million in order to permit this appeal.  This Court should reverse and reinstate 
the jury’s verdict, or at minimum, vacate and remand for an unconditional new trial 
in which damages may be valued by a hypothetical license measure.   
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the stipulated final 
judgment as to which Oracle preserved its right to appeal.  See, e.g.,  U.A. Local 
342 Apprenticeship & Training Trust v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 396 F.3d 
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1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005).  On August 31, 2012, Oracle filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal from the final judgment entered on August 3, 2012.  ER97-98. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court erred in granting SAP post-trial judgment as 
a matter of law on hypothetical license damages for admitted copyright 
infringement, where (a) such damages do not depend upon actual willingness to 
license or “benchmark” licenses; and (b) Oracle presented overwhelming objective 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the fair market value of 
a license for SAP’s infringing use was $1.3 billion.  
2. Whether the district court erred in ordering a new trial limited to lost 
profits and infringer’s profits if Oracle rejected a $272 million remittitur, where (a) 
Oracle presented overwhelming objective evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that the fair market value of a license for SAP’s infringing use was 
$1.3 billion; (b) the district court imposed its additional prerequisites to 
hypothetical license damages only after the jury had returned its verdict; and (c) 
the remittitur was set below the maximum amount sustainable by the proof.  
3. Whether, in any new trial, Oracle should be able (a) to recover actual 
damages and infringer’s profits; (b) to present evidence of SAP’s saved research 
and development costs; (c) to exclude SAP’s evidence of overhead expenses; and 
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(d) to exclude testimony by SAP’s damages expert that was unreliable and outside 
his expertise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
Oracle filed its complaint against SAP in March 2007 (D.E.1) and filed the 
operative Fourth Amended Complaint in August 2009 (ER1361-1435).  Oracle 
asserted ten claims against SAP under the Copyright Act, the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, and state law.  ER1411-31.1  With respect to the copyright claim, 
Oracle alleged that SAP had infringed 120 copyright registrations on Oracle 
software and related support materials, and sought both actual damages and 
“profits attributable to the infringement not taken into account in computing actual 
damages” under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  ER1418.   
In August 2009, SAP filed the first of two motions for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that Oracle was not entitled to seek hypothetical license 
damages on its copyright claim.  D.E.447.  In January 2010, the district court 
denied the motion.  ER1293.  In August 2010, the district court largely denied 
SAP’s second partial summary judgment motion, but did rule that hypothetical 
license damages could not encompass any research and development costs that 
SAP saved as a result of the infringing conduct.  ER93-94.   
                                           
1   The non-copyright claims are not at issue on appeal. 
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In September 2010, the district court issued its Final Pretrial Order, which, 
among other things, denied Oracle’s Daubert motion to exclude SAP damages 
expert Stephen Clarke.  ER69. 
Immediately prior to trial, TN stipulated to liability on all claims (ER1238) 
and SAP AG and SAP America stipulated to liability for contributory copyright 
infringement (ER1236), with each reserving its defenses to damages.  Following a 
thirteen-day damages trial on the copyright claims in November 2010 featuring 28 
witnesses and 190 exhibits, a jury concluded that actual damages should be 
measured by the fair market value of a hypothetical license rather than by lost 
profits, and awarded Oracle $1.3 billion in actual damages.  ER161.  In September 
2011, the district court granted SAP’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 
law (“JMOL”) with respect to hypothetical license damages (ER26-36), as well as 
SAP’s motion for a new trial, the latter conditioned on Oracle’s rejection of a $272 
million remittitur (the “JMOL/New Trial Order”) (ER36-40).  
Oracle moved for a stay of proceedings pending the filing and disposition of 
a motion to certify the JMOL/New Trial Order for interlocutory appeal.  D.E.1086.  
The district court denied the stay (the “Stay Order”) (ER19) and, later, the request 
for certification (D.E.1103).  In denying the stay, the district court sought to clarify 
its JMOL ruling.  ER20. 
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Oracle rejected the remittitur in February 2012 (ER160), and the parties 
proceeded toward a second trial.  Oracle moved to clarify whether it could present 
evidence of hypothetical license damages (D.E.1120), to exclude certain evidence 
regarding cost reductions relevant to measuring infringer’s profits (D.E. 1145), and 
to exclude testimony by SAP expert Clarke (id.).  The court denied each motion.  
ER12-13, ER18. 
The parties thereafter stipulated to the entry of judgment in Oracle’s favor in 
the amount of $306 million.  ER4.  The final stipulated judgment, as to which 
Oracle reserved its right to appeal, was entered in August 2012.  ER1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS  
A. Oracle’s And SAP’s Competition In The Enterprise Software 
Industry  
Oracle and SAP are long-time competitors in the enterprise software 
industry, although SAP is “a much larger company in the applications segment.”  
ER185, ER189-90.  Oracle devotes “massive” resources to the “long and arduous 
process” of developing software designed to help customers manage and grow 
their businesses (ER178-79, ER280, ER1376), funding its research and 
development through license and maintenance fees that customers pay to obtain 
technical support and software updates (ER179, ER166).   
In January 2005, Oracle completed an $11 billion acquisition of PeopleSoft 
(ER343-44), giving it access to PeopleSoft’s 9,920 customers (ER306-07), 
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including those from PeopleSoft’s prior acquisition of J.D. Edwards.   Oracle thus 
nearly doubled its share of the enterprise applications market (ER186, ER366-68, 
ER926) and could now “aggressively challenge SAP for leadership in business 
software solutions” (ER1002).  Oracle based its acquisition price on a model that 
reasonably assumed retention of nearly 90% of PeopleSoft customers and receipt 
of the accompanying support/update revenue stream for at least ten years.  ER195-
96, ER309, ER1133, ER1159-1162.  Oracle anticipated earning $5.4 billion from 
PeopleSoft customers in the first four years alone.  ER146-47, ER297-98, 
ER1162.1.  
B. SAP’s Acquisition Of TomorrowNow With Knowledge Of Its 
Infringement  
In response to Oracle’s acquisition, SAP devised a “dramatic, market-
changing” plan to mount “an immediate and serious challenge to Oracle” through 
the acquisition of TN (ER903, ER252, ER661-62), which—enabled by its massive 
illicit copying of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software—provided half-price 
software maintenance to and updates of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software 
applications (ER737-38).  SAP’s top executives considered TN a “strategic 
weapon against Oracle” (ER881, ER687) and the “cornerstone” of its so-called 
“Safe Passage program,” which was designed to recruit PeopleSoft and J.D. 
Edwards customers  (ER678, ER663-64, ER685, ER881, ER888, ER902-06) with 
the “number one single-minded ambition” of converting them to SAP’s competing 
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software (ER510-11; see also ER789-99, ER881, ER733, ER245-48, ER221).  
SAP acknowledged that it could not achieve this ambition without TN:  SAP’s 
“market research show[ed] that [TN] [was] the only meaningful North American 
provider of third party PeopleSoft maintenance services.”  ER820.  As SAP 
America Director Werner Brandt acknowledged at trial, “[TN] was the only 
company in North America that had the capacity to do what SAP wanted done.”  
ER246-47.   
The SAP Executive Board acquired TN with full knowledge that “there 
could be substantial legal issues with TomorrowNow’s service delivery processes.”  
ER266; see also ER252, ER255.  The Board knew that TN had no research and 
development department (ER268, ER1049), knew that TN owned no relevant 
intellectual property (ER893), commissioned an investigation that concluded that it 
was “very likely that TomorrowNow is using the software outside the contractual 
use rights granted to them” (ER784), and reviewed a report warning that “the 
access rights to the PeopleSoft software is very likely to be challenged by Oracle” 
(ER824, ER265).  SAP nonetheless acquired TN “with the knowledge that there 
was a risk that Oracle would sue” (ER704-05, ER656-57) and retained TN’s 
corporate existence in the hope that it would act as a “liability shield” (ER825). 
SAP devised a strategy for TN to continue offering software maintenance to 
customers of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards at half the price Oracle did, which 
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allowed SAP to gain support revenues for TN in the short term and substantially 
greater revenues for itself in the long term by tying discounted support on 
PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software to a deal that transitioned those customers 
to SAP licenses and SAP support.  ER243, ER705-06, ER746, ER761-62, ER764-
76, ER861-63, ER874, ER902-06, ER979, ER1134, ER1167-70.  According to a 
December 23, 2004 “Roadmap for PSFT Customers to SAP,” unanimously 
adopted by the SAP Executive Board, SAP projected that it would earn $897 
million in revenue in just three years from offering TN’s maintenance service and 
converting part of that customer base.  ER678-79, ER699-700, ER799.  SAP 
further understood that, by diverting Oracle’s new PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards 
customers to TN’s half-price support offering, it would deprive Oracle of revenues 
Oracle could have used to pay for the PeopleSoft acquisition and to invest in 
research and development, and, accordingly, “contain Oracle’s potential growth in 
the next generation application market.”  ER903; see ER251-52, ER674-75, 
ER705-06, ER861. 
SAP thus calculated TN’s financial benefit to SAP as far exceeding the mere 
amount of support revenues SAP obtained.  In April 2006, for example, SAP 
estimated that: 
Every $1 of 2005 closed [TN] business typically represents…  
1. $2 taken from Oracle’s annual maintenance  
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2. $20 taken away from any 10-year maintenance-based justification 
for the PeopleSoft/JDE takeover  
3. $10 increase to SAP’s strategic license revenue pipeline. 
ER1158; see ER878 (“Over the long term, every $1 of TN Stand-alone revenue 
this year represents $18 of originally expected Oracle revenue from their 
misguided acquisition strategy.”). 
C. SAP’s Massive Copyright Infringement  
The warnings to SAP’s board were correct:  as is now undisputed, TN built 
its entire business upon unlicensed downloads and copies of Oracle’s copyrighted 
software and support materials.  This downloading was massive in scope and 
essential to TN’s business model.  Oracle’s technical expert, Kevin Mandia, found 
over 10 million downloaded Oracle files on TN’s systems—some five terabytes of 
material.  ER494.  Mandia also found evidence of “about 7,100 or more copies of 
Oracle applications software and Oracle database software,” some 10 terabytes, 
that had been on TN’s servers.  ER496-97.2  To create these copies, TN obtained 
installation CDs and DVDs from its customers, copied them onto its computers, 
used passwords to illicitly download software and software updates from Oracle’s 
websites, and used that software to develop and test fixes and updates to Oracle 
software using a significant amount of Oracle’s own code.  ER506, ER749-54. 
                                           
2   “Database software” refers to Oracle’s Relational Database Management 
System, which was used by customers running PeopleSoft on an Oracle database.  
See ER236-37, ER560-61.  
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SAP took no steps to ensure that TN stopped infringing.  ER264-65, ER712-
15, ER717.  After Oracle acquired Siebel Systems for $6.1 billion in 2006,3 SAP 
expanded TN’s service offering to Siebel products even though it knew doing so 
entailed further illicit use because “at that time, [TN] didn’t have any people at all 
who had any experience with Siebel software.”  ER269.   
In November 2006, an Oracle employee noticed suspicious downloads and 
Oracle’s prompt investigation quickly identified unauthorized downloads on a 
massive scale.  ER169-72.  Oracle filed this action in March 2007, but SAP 
stopped TN’s infringing conduct only a year later and only after SAP could not 
find a buyer for TN.  ER258, ER514-18, ER754.  TN closed in October 2008.  
ER175. 
D. The Pre-Trial Proceedings  
1. The Summary Judgment Rulings   
SAP filed two motions for partial summary judgment seeking to limit the 
damages available to Oracle.  First, SAP sought a ruling that Oracle was not 
entitled to pursue hypothetical license damages on the copyright claim on the 
ground that “the undisputed evidence shows that, but for infringement, the parties 
never would have entered into a license for the copyrighted material at issue.”  
                                           
3   Oracle’s Siebel acquisition model projected that it would receive $500 
million in annual maintenance revenue from 4,000 acquired Siebel customers.  
ER1132 (D.E.1058-36), ER315-16, ER449-50. 
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ER1293.  The district court denied the motion, ruling that Oracle was “not required 
to prove that it would have successfully negotiated a license with SAP” and that 
Oracle was not “precluded from seeking license damages simply because it has 
never before licensed what SAP infringed.”  ER1296.  The court explained that the 
pertinent question for calculating hypothetical license damages “is not what Oracle 
would have charged for a license, ‘but what is the fair market value.’”  ER1297 
(quoting Davis v. The Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
Second, SAP sought partial summary judgment on certain claims and 
damages theories, arguing, among other things, that Oracle was not entitled to 
recover development costs that SAP saved as a result of the infringing conduct.  
D.E.813 (refiled D.E.640).  The district court granted summary judgment to SAP 
on this issue, analyzing “whether plaintiffs are entitled to recoup all their research 
and development costs as actual damages for defendants’ infringement” (ER93) 
(emphasis added), rather than considering whether SAP’s saved research and 
development costs were relevant to determining the fair market value of a 
hypothetical license.4  
                                           
4   In a footnote, the district court also stated that Oracle’s calculations of 
saved development costs were speculative because there was no evidence of what 
SAP would have spent (ER94 n.5), disregarding that Oracle in fact sought to 
present just such evidence (ER1323, ER1333). 
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2. The Denial Of Oracle’s Daubert Motion   
The district court also denied Oracle’s motion to exclude SAP’s damages 
expert Stephen Clarke.  Oracle contended in its motion and again at trial that (1) 
Clarke was not qualified to opine on why customers left Oracle since his 
background was in accounting, not consumer behavior; (2) Clarke likewise was not 
qualified to opine on whether viable alternatives existed in the market absent TN; 
and (3) Clarke’s methodology for determining viable alternatives was unreliable 
since it was based solely on Internet research.  D.E.781; ER58-63.  The district 
court rejected these arguments, concluding that they went only to the weight of the 
testimony.  ER69; see ER58, ER63-64, ER1264. 
E. The Damages Trial Following SAP’s Stipulation To Liability 
Immediately prior to trial, TN “stipulate[d] to all liability on all claims” and 
SAP AG and SAP America “stipulate[d] to vicarious liability on the copyright 
claims against TN in their entirety.”  ER1239.  Specifically, TN admitted that it 
“copied millions of updates and support materials for [J.D. Edwards], PeopleSoft, 
and Siebel by downloading them from Oracle’s websites [onto] [TN’s] computers” 
and “further copied certain portions of those materials” internally.  ER506.  SAP 
AG and SAP America also stipulated that they are liable for contributory 
infringement (ER1237), admitting that “they knew or had reason to know of the 
infringing activity of [TN]; and … they intentionally materially contributed to the 
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infringing activity” (ER507).  SAP, however, retained its defenses to damages.  
ER1239-40.5  
At trial, Oracle’s damages presentation focused on the fair market value of a 
hypothetical license for TN’s infringing use that Oracle and SAP might have 
negotiated in January 2005 and, with respect to Siebel, in September 2006.  
Oracle’s damages expert, Paul Meyer, provided extensive testimony regarding the 
substantial contemporaneous evidence admitted at trial, including financial 
modeling and top-level business strategy on both sides, that would have driven 
such negotiations.  ER324-78, ER385-452, ER456-63.  Meyer applied established 
valuation methodology to that evidence, opining that, at a hypothetical negotiation, 
the parties would have agreed that the fair market value of SAP’s use of Oracle’s 
copyrighted software was at least $1.656 billion:  $1.5 billion for PeopleSoft, $100 
million for Siebel, and $56 million for the Oracle Database.  ER430-32, ER451-52, 
ER460-62.  Although SAP’s expert Clarke offered lower figures, he agreed that, 
given TN’s sweeping use of Oracle’s copyrighted materials, the hypothetical 
license would have had to allow “virtually unlimited copies of  Oracle’s software 
whenever [SAP and TN] needed.”  ER602-03, ER1187.   
                                           
5   In an effort to streamline the trial, the parties agreed that Oracle would not 
seek monetary relief on the non-copyright claims.  ER1247.  
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Oracle’s expert Meyer also provided measures of Oracle’s lost profits and 
SAP’s infringer’s profits, reasoning that, through 2015, defections would cause 
Oracle to suffer $120.7 million in lost profits and give SAP $288 million in 
illegitimate infringer’s profits.  ER436-37, ER468-82, ER488-89.  These numbers 
rested on the conclusion that SAP’s infringing use of Oracle’s copyrighted 
materials had helped to cause 253 out of 358 customers to leave Oracle for SAP 
and 66 out of 86 customers who purchased software in addition to support from 
SAP to do so.  ER293-94, ER472-73, ER478-81.  Meyer used the 2015 date to 
reflect the fact that customers who signed with a competitor were unlikely to 
return:  “[W]hen a customer leaves, it doesn’t come back, you break the service, 
you lose the relationship.”  ER476.  Meyer also calculated, in the alternative, that if 
the impact of the infringement ceased when SAP closed TN in 2008, Oracle had 
suffered $36 million in lost profits while SAP obtained $236 million in infringer’s 
profits.  ER436, ER468.  Both lost profits figures would have been much higher 
had the district court not ruled pre-trial that Oracle’s measure of lost profits was 
limited to software support services diverted from Oracle to TN.  See ER1335-36; 
D.E.532.6  
                                           
6   The ruling precluded Oracle from offering evidence of substantial lost up-
sell transactions (i.e., upgrades) and cross-sell opportunities (i.e., sales of 
additional services to an existing customer) attributable to SAP’s infringement; lost 
profits related to customers that did not become customers of TN (e.g., discounts 
given in response to TN, and the abandonment of contractually scheduled price 
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Instructed to determine which measure of damages would best compensate 
Oracle—Oracle’s lost profits or a hypothetical license—the jury chose the latter 
and assessed the value of such a license at $1.3 billion.  ER161.  The jury did not 
consider whether to additionally award non-duplicative infringer’s profits, as the 
district court declined (ER161) over Oracle’s objection (ER631-34) to instruct the 
jury that Oracle could recover both. 
F. The District Court’s Post-Trial Rulings 
1. The JMOL And New Trial Order 
Following the jury’s verdict, SAP renewed its JMOL motion on hypothetical 
license damages and also moved for new trial.  The district court granted both 
motions, conditioning the latter on Oracle’s rejection of a remittitur to $272 
million.   
The JMOL decision rested on two grounds.  First, while acknowledging that 
this Court “has never explicitly held that hypothetical [license] damages are not 
available absent actual proof that the plaintiff would have licensed the infringed 
work to the defendant or a third party for the specific use at issue” (ER33), the 
district court ruled that, “to establish its entitlement to recover hypothetical license 
damages, Oracle was required to show that, but for infringement, the parties would 
have agreed to license the use of the copyrighted works at issue.”  ER31; contra 
                                                                                                                                        
increases); and expenses incurred in order to respond to TN (e.g., the early 
adoption of Oracle’s Lifetime Support and Applications Unlimited programs).    
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ER1296 (ruling at summary judgment that no such proof was required).  The court 
concluded that Oracle had not satisfied that burden because it “offered no evidence 
of the type on which plaintiffs ordinarily rely to prove that they would have 
entered into such a license, such as past licensing history or a plaintiff’s previous 
licensing practices.”  ER31-32. 
Second, the district court ruled that “the evidence Oracle presented was 
insufficient to establish an objective non-speculative license price.”  ER32; contra 
ER1296 (ruling at summary judgment that no such proof was required).  The court 
stated that the hypothetical license price must be “established through objective 
evidence of benchmark transactions, such as licenses previously negotiated for 
comparable use of the infringed work, and benchmark licenses for comparable uses 
of comparable works.”  ER32.  The court concluded that, because “Oracle failed to 
present evidence of benchmark licenses,” it “cannot recover a lost license fee 
award.”  ER32; see also ER35 (similar). 
The district court also granted SAP a new trial, limited to lost profits and 
infringer’s profits, on the ground that the jury’s verdict was “contrary to the weight 
of the evidence.”  ER38.  This ruling rested on the JMOL decision and the court’s 
view that Oracle had presented insufficient evidence of hypothetical license 
damages:   
Rather than providing evidence of SAP’s actual use of the copyrighted 
works, and [an] objectively verifiable number of customers lost as a 
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result, Oracle presented evidence of the purported value of the 
intellectual property as a whole, elicited self-serving testimony from 
its executives regarding the price they claim they would have 
demanded in an admittedly fictional negotiation, and proffered the 
speculative opinion of its damages experts, which was based on little 
more than guesses about the parties’ expectations.   
ER38. 
 The district court conditioned the new trial on Oracle’s rejection of a 
remittitur to $272 million.  ER38.  This amount reflected the $36 million in lost 
profits and $236 million in infringer’s profits calculated by Oracle’s damages 
expert Meyer through 2008, disregarding his calculation of $120.7 million in lost 
profits through 2015 and finding his calculation of $288 million in infringer’s 
profits “unduly speculative.”  ER40. 
Oracle moved to certify the JMOL/New Trial Order for interlocutory appeal 
and for a stay pending disposition of that motion.  D.E. 1085.  The district court 
denied the stay, sua sponte “clarify[ing]” that its previous order “did not hold as a 
matter of law” that hypothetical license damages “are available only if the 
copyright owner provides evidence of actual licenses it entered into or would have 
entered into for the infringed works, and/or actual ‘benchmark’ licenses entered 
into by any party for comparable use of the infringed or comparable works,” but 
instead had ruled: 
that evidence provided by Oracle was not sufficient to support an 
award of hypothetical license damages because it failed to provide 
objective evidence of what a willing buyer would have paid, and 
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because it failed to provide evidence sufficient to allow the jury to 
assess fair market value without undue speculation. 
ER20. 
2. The Rulings Following Oracle’s Rejection Of The 
Remittitur  
In February 2012, Oracle rejected the remittitur, seeking instead “to 
vindicate the verdict of the jury and Oracle’s intellectual property rights as a 
copyright owner.”  ER160.  Oracle moved to clarify that, in the second trial, it 
could present evidence of hypothetical license damages.  D.E.1120  The district 
court denied the motion, restricting Oracle to proof of lost profits and infringer’s 
profits.  ER18.   Oracle thereafter submitted an offer of proof as to the hypothetical 
license evidence that it would have presented in a second trial.  ER108-58.  
In preparation for the second trial, Oracle also filed several motions in limine 
regarding lost profits and infringer’s profits.  As relevant here, Oracle sought to 
preclude SAP from introducing evidence regarding deductions of overhead 
expenses from SAP’s infringer’s profits, arguing that such deductions were not 
available to willful infringers.  D.E.1145, at 15-16.  The district court denied the 
motion.  ER13.  Oracle also renewed its motion to exclude testimony by SAP 
expert Clarke.  D.E.1145, at 2-11.  The district court denied that motion as well, 
relying on its prior rulings.  ER12. 
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G. The Stipulated Judgment 
As the second trial approached, the parties engaged in extensive court-
sponsored mediation that led to an agreement in which they stipulated to the entry 
of a $306 million judgment in Oracle’s favor.  ER4.  In the stipulation, Oracle 
contended that, but for the limitations established by the district court’s rulings, its 
recovery in a new trial would be greater than $306 million.  ER5.  The parties also 
expressly reserved their rights to appeal.  ER6.  After judgment was entered (ER1), 
Oracle appealed and SAP cross-appealed.     
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT   
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district 
court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Oracle in the amount $1.3 
billion.  The jury’s award of hypothetical license damages, which are a long-
accepted measure of actual damages under the Copyright Act, was supported by 
overwhelming, contemporaneous evidence, and the district court overreached in 
substituting its view of the evidence for that of the jury. 
1. The district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law under Rule 
50(b) on hypothetical license damages rests on at least three errors.  First, contrary 
to the district court’s ruling, the parties’ actual willingness to license is not a 
prerequisite to an award of hypothetical license damages, which assume the 
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existence of both a willing buyer and a willing seller, and provide a tool for 
measuring the fair market value of the infringing use.   
Nor, second, is evidence of “benchmark” licensing practices necessary to 
support an award of hypothetical license damages.  Such a requirement would both 
contradict a copyright holder’s right not to license his works and conflict with 
valuation of royalty rates in the analogous patent context, which does not require 
reliance on “benchmark” transactions. 
Third, the district court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 
that no reasonable juror could have valued a hypothetical license for SAP’s use of 
Oracle’s copyrighted materials at $1.3 billion.  Oracle in fact provided a wealth of 
evidence from which a rational jury could have found that a hypothetical 
negotiation would have resulted in that price.  That evidence included the massive 
scope of SAP’s infringement (and thus of the use for which SAP would have 
required a license); SAP’s own contemporaneous short-term and long-term 
expected benefits from its infringement; the $11 billion sum Oracle paid for 
PeopleSoft; and the parties’ own contemporaneous financial projections showing a 
total expected revenue swing of nearly $2.3 billion from the use of PeopleSoft 
materials alone.  Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, it is clear that the 
verdict falls within the range of reasonable market value. 
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2. The district court erred for similar reasons in granting a new trial 
under Rule 59 limited to lost profits and infringer’s profits, as the jury’s verdict 
was supported by overwhelming contemporaneous evidence of the value both 
parties would have placed on SAP’s intended use of Oracle’s copyrighted 
materials.  But even if a new damages trial were warranted, Oracle should be 
permitted in that new trial to seek hypothetical license damages, not only lost 
profits and infringer’s profits.  Such an unconditional new trial is appropriate 
where proof of damages was found speculative, especially where the district court 
changes the rules after the close of proof (here, by requiring proof of actual 
willingness to license and benchmark licenses).  At the very least, the remittitur 
should be increased from $272 million to $408.7 million, which reflects the 
maximum amount of lost profits and infringer’s profits supported by the evidence 
at trial. 
3. If the Court orders a new trial and/or increases the remittitur, it should 
correct the district court’s evidentiary errors to avoid tainting any further 
proceedings.  First, the court wrongly declined to instruct the jury that Oracle 
could recover both hypothetical license damages and infringer’s profits not taken 
into account in computing those damages.  The Copyright Act explicitly permits 
recovery of both types of awards, and this Court has recognized the same. 
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Second, the district court erred by preventing Oracle from recovering SAP’s 
saved research and development costs.  Such costs are part of the “value of use” of 
Oracle’s copyrighted materials, and are permissible evidence of hypothetical 
license damages. 
Third, contrary to the district court’s ruling before the second trial, SAP 
should not be permitted to offer evidence of its overhead expenses in an effort to 
diminish its profits from the infringement.  This Court has held, at least with 
respect to willful infringers (like SAP), that such expenses do not constitute 
“deductible expenses” under the Copyright Act.   
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in permitting SAP’s damages 
expert, Stephen Clarke, to testify regarding consumer behavior and his “market 
study.”  Not only was Clarke unqualified to opine on such topics (his training and 
experience is limited to accounting), but his opinions were unreliable since his 
methodologies were either ad hoc (consumer behavior) or based solely on 
unverified Internet research (“market studies”).   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court “review[s] the district court’s order granting a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 de novo,” applying the same 
standard as the district court and giving the jury’s verdict the same deference as 
was owed by the district court.  Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., 575 F.3d 935, 
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938-39 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Polar Bear Prods. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 
708 (9th Cir. 2004) (same standard as to copyright damages).  This Court also 
reviews de novo a district court’s other legal rulings, including a grant of summary 
judgment and jury instructions.  See, e.g., Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d 
1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 
2007); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2005).  
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion an order granting a new trial, see, 
e.g., Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009), 
as well as evidentiary rulings, see, e.g., United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794, 
800-01 (9th Cir. 2004).  “Under this standard, reversal is appropriate only where 
the trial court made an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or where 
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the district court 
committed a clear error of judgment.”  Id. at 801 (citation and internal quotation 
omitted).  An erroneous exclusion of evidence is reversible if the error was not 
harmless.  Id. at 808. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE THE JURY VERDICT OF $1.3 
BILLION BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
ENTERING POST-TRIAL JUDGMENT THAT ORACLE’S 
EVIDENCE OF ITS HYPOTHETICAL LICENSE DAMAGES WAS 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Entry of judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is an extraordinary 
remedy that “is properly granted only if no reasonable juror could find in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Mangum, 575 F.3d at 938-39 (quotation omitted).  On a 
JMOL motion, a district court may not “weigh the evidence,” and “must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all 
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”  EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 
581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).  The district 
court’s grant of JMOL on hypothetical license damages was error under these 
standards. 
To begin with, this Court has long held that hypothetical license damages are 
a proper measure under the Copyright Act of “the actual damages suffered by [a 
copyright owner] as a result of the infringement,” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  See, e.g., 
Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709 (“[I]t is not improper for a jury to consider either a 
hypothetical lost license fee or the value of the infringing use to the infringer to 
determine actual damages, provided the amount is not based on ‘undue 
speculation.’”) (quoting McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 
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557, 566 (7th Cir. 2003)); Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 533-35 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(copyright holder entitled to recover fair market value of license that defendant did 
not obtain prior to infringing use); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 
F.3d 769, 786 (9th Cir. 2006) (approving instruction defining “actual damages” as 
“the amount a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay a willing 
seller at the time of the infringement for the actual use made by the [defendant] of 
the plaintiff’s work”).  The purpose of hypothetical license damages is to give the 
jury a tool for measuring the value of the right that has been infringed.  See Wall 
Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; see also 2 GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 14.1.1.1(b) (noting that such damages represent a value between the 
minimum that a reasonable seller would have demanded and the maximum that a 
reasonable buyer would have been willing to pay).  
Moreover, the evidence clearly supported a rational jury’s conclusions that 
Oracle’s actual damages were best measured by the value of a hypothetical license 
and that such a license was worth $1.3 billion.  
A. The District Court Erred In Requiring Evidence Of Actual 
Willingness To License Or “Benchmark” Licenses To Support 
Hypothetical License Damages 
Contrary to the district court’s post-trial JMOL/New Trial Order (ER22-41) 
(later partially disclaimed by the court’s Stay Order sua sponte clarifying the 
original order) (ER19-21)), hypothetical license damages do not require a plaintiff 
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to establish that it actually would have licensed the defendant or to prove the 
existence of any comparable third-party “benchmark” licenses. 
1. An Award Of Hypothetical License Damages Does Not 
Require Proof Of Actual Willingness To License 
Because hypothetical license damages measure injury to the value of the 
plaintiff’s intellectual property by assuming the existence of both a willing buyer 
and a willing seller, e.g., Davis, 246 F.3d at 171-72; Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786, 
such a measure does not require proof of actual willingness to license.  To the 
contrary, “whether the infringer might in fact have negotiated with the owner or 
purchased at the owner’s price is irrelevant to the purpose of the test.”  Davis, 246 
F.3d at 171-72 (emphasis added); see also McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567 
(defendant’s argument that it would not have chosen to license the copyrighted 
materials “misses the point”).    
The district court thus erred in describing a hypothetical license as a measure 
of “license fees … actually lost as a result of the infringement” (ER33 (emphasis 
added)) and in ruling that Oracle could not recover hypothetical license damages 
absent evidence that “the parties would have agreed to [a] license” (ER22).7  A 
copyright holder is entitled not to license its work.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990) (“[N]othing in the copyright statutes would prevent an 
                                           
7   The Stay Order’s “clarification” of the JMOL/New Trial Order did not 
modify this aspect of the court’s ruling.  See ER31. 
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author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”); Laws v. 
Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (similar).8  It would 
turn copyright protection on its head to restrict damages to lost profits where the 
copyright owner refuses to license its work—such a plaintiff would have no lost 
profits to claim, and, under the district court’s reasoning, no basis for seeking a 
hypothetical license, leaving the copyright owner with no actual damages remedy 
at all. 
The district court likewise erred in asserting that this Court has “expressly 
rejected the argument that damage in the form of lost licensing opportunities may 
be ‘presumed’ as a ‘natural and probable result’ of infringement.”  ER33 (citing  
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 513-14 (9th Cir. 
1985)).  The plaintiff in Frank Music (which considered the Copyright Act of 
1909, rather than the current statute) did not seek hypothetical license damages, but 
instead sought lost profits on the theory that the defendant’s misappropriation of 
six minutes of music effectively precluded the plaintiff from presenting its own, 
                                           
8   Patent law is analogous to copyright law on this point, considering as one 
relevant factor in valuing damages “[t]he licensor’s established policy and 
marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use 
the invention.”  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 
1971); see Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 
2d 290, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (reluctance to license “weighs in favor of higher 
royalty rate”). 
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much longer musical theater production.  Id. at 513.  The plaintiff elicited evidence 
regarding the income it would have received from its production, but this Court 
found no clear error in the district court’s refusal, following bench trial, to allow 
recovery of such damages, since the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence 
of causation; namely, that the infringement had “significantly impair[ed] the 
prospects for presenting a full production.”  Id.  In a footnote, this Court declined 
to hold that lost profits should be presumed from infringement, id. at 514 n.8, but it 
did not address the standard for recovering hypothetical license damages, much 
less require actual lost license fees as a prerequisite to recovering such damages.  
No such prerequisite exists. 
2. An Award Of Hypothetical License Damages Does Not 
Require Proof Of “Benchmark” Licenses  
There is likewise no requirement that a copyright holder provide evidence of 
“benchmark” licenses in order to establish hypothetical license damages.  See 2 
GOLDSTEIN, supra, § 14.1.1.1(b) (explaining that market-value damages are 
appropriate even “[w]hen a preexisting license with the infringer or a third party is 
not available as a benchmark for determining actual damages”).  Such a 
requirement would create unnecessary tension with the right of a copyright holder 
not to license his works, see, e.g., Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29; Laws, 448 F.3d at 
1137, by narrowing the available remedies for infringement in circumstances 
where copyrights are of such value that licenses are rarely or never granted.   
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The district court based its erroneous imposition of such an obligation on its 
observations that a “hypothetical license price requires an ‘objective, not a 
subjective’ analysis” and that “‘excessively speculative’ claims must be rejected.”  
ER32 (citing, e.g., Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 
(9th Cir. 2002)).  But neither of these general rules regarding damages valuation 
implies a rigid requirement of any particular type of proof.  In analogous patent 
contexts, courts assess a royalty rate between direct competitors without the aid of 
any reliable comparator “benchmark” transactions, see, e.g., Georgia-Pacific, 318 
F. Supp. at 1124, relying upon the plaintiff’s expected losses and the defendant’s 
expected profits at the time of the hypothesized agreement as bases for estimating 
the royalty, id. at 1129-32.9     
To the contrary, limitation to “objective” inquiries is meant simply to head 
off consideration of the value of subjective “hurt feelings” occurring as a result of 
an infringement, Mackie, 296 F.3d at 916-17, or exclusive reliance on the 
plaintiff’s own testimony about what he “thought he should have earned or wished 
he had charged,” Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; see also Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 (“The 
question is not what the owner would have charged, but rather what is the fair 
market value.”); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra, § 14.1.1.1(b) (willing-buyer/willing-seller 
                                           
9   SAP agreed at trial that Georgia-Pacific provides an appropriate valuation 
framework (ER639), and its expert used that framework to value the hypothetical 
license here (ER548-51). 
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measure “is essentially an objective rather than a subjective measure of damages”).  
And the requirement that a verdict not be “excessively speculative” is just a 
restatement of the general requirement that a jury award be “sufficiently supported 
by [substantial] evidence.”  Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708.   
None of these concerns mandates proof of actual comparable licenses, and 
many other forms of objective evidence can establish a hypothetical license 
valuation that is within the “range of the reasonable market value,” id. at 709, as 
the evidence overwhelmingly did here. 
B. The District Court Erred In Ruling That Oracle’s Hypothetical 
License Damages Evidence Was Insufficient As A Matter Of Law 
The court also erred under Rule 50(b) in overturning the jury’s verdict 
insofar as it found the evidence too speculative to support the jury’s damages 
figure.  A district court may not set aside a copyright damages verdict that is within 
“the range of the reasonable market value.”  Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; see also 
Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534-35 (affirming award of damages that “was near the center 
of the range supported by the evidence); Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786-87 (upholding 
award that fell “within an acceptable range … sustainable by the proof”) (quotation 
omitted); McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567 (copyright holder “was not required to 
establish the actual value [of rights infringed]; it was required only to provide 
sufficient evidence of the value so that the jury did not have to resort to undue 
speculation in estimating actual damages”).  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
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favorable to Oracle and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s 
verdict, it was error to conclude that no reasonable juror could have reached the 
$1.3 billion award returned below.  E.g., Go Daddy, 581 F.3d at 961.   
1. Overwhelming Evidence Supports The Jury’s Valuation Of 
A Hypothetical License At $1.3 Billion 
The jury’s award of $1.3 billion in hypothetical license damages rested upon 
numerous objective sources at trial.  First, a hypothetical license between Oracle 
and SAP would have taken into account the value of TN’s massive infringement.  
See Thoroughbred Software Int’l, Inc. v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 359 (6th Cir. 
2007) (defendant “is liable for the unpaid license fees for all the unauthorized 
copies it made, regardless of whether these copies were accessible to or used by 
[its] customers”).  It is undisputed that any hypothetical license here would have 
authorized SAP to obtain access to millions of copyrighted files.  TN had twenty 
servers containing improperly downloaded or copied Oracle software, as well as 
thousands of copies of installations of Oracle’s copyrighted works—a total of over 
fifteen terabytes of copies of Oracle’s software (ER492-96).  Oracle’s expert 
estimated that the illegal downloads alone, which totaled over five terabytes of 
infringing data, would encircle the globe nine times if printed out on double-sided 
paper laid end-to-end.  ER495.  SAP’s damages expert agreed that a license for 
such sweeping use of Oracle’s copyrighted materials would have had to allow 
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“virtually unlimited copies of Oracle’s software whenever [SAP and TN] 
needed.”  ER602-03, ER1187. 
Second, any hypothetical license between Oracle and SAP also would have 
taken into account SAP’s expected benefits from its use of those stolen materials.  
See Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; Thoroughbred Software, 
488 F.3d at 359.  As is the rule in the parallel patent-law context, and as was 
agreed by both parties’ experts (ER439, ER580-81), “the negotiation must be 
hypothesized as of the time infringement began,” so that the license fee is based on 
“sales expectations at the time when infringement begins, … as opposed to an 
after-the-fact counting of actual sales.”  Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite 
Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also McRoberts, 329 
F.3d at 566 (endorsing this rule in copyright case).  Here, the jury was presented 
with evidence of both SAP’s short-term expected benefits from support revenues 
and its long-term expected benefits from reducing Oracle’s scale and market share.  
See supra, at 13-15.  By using TN to gain access to PeopleSoft’s customer base, 
SAP aimed “to attack Oracle” (ER725) by “shrink[ing] Oracle’s share of the 
application market and increas[ing] SAP’s share” while “contain[ing] Oracle’s 
potential growth in the next generation application market.”  ER251-52, ER903.  
SAP aimed to “disrupt[] Oracle’s ability to pay for the [PeopleSoft] acquisition out 
of cash flow” and to divert “cash flow that could otherwise be used for research 
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and development.”  ER252, ER675, ER705.  A rational jury thus was amply 
entitled to conclude that any hypothetical license would include those substantial 
expected medium- and long-term benefits to SAP, far exceeding the amount of any 
existing sales.  ER596-98.   
Third, a rational jury was entitled to consider that Oracle had just paid $11 
billion, in an arm’s-length transaction, to acquire PeopleSoft and the 
accompanying intellectual property that SAP and TN admittedly stole.  ER190-91, 
ER284-85.  PeopleSoft had spent between $500-$600 million annually to develop 
its software (ER311-12), and by acquiring that software and the accompanying 
customer base (along with Siebel’s), Oracle expected to earn an annual income 
stream of $1.7 billion in the form of the very software maintenance payments SAP 
planned to divert away with the TN offering.  ER622-23, ER319.  Although 
hypothetical license damages may not reflect one party’s subjective valuation of 
the rights at issue, see Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534, the jury could reasonably have 
considered the contemporaneous purchase price resulting from an arm’s-length 
negotiation in the course of assessing the objective “amount [that] would have been 
acceptable by a prudent [copyright holder] who was willing to grant a license,” 
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120; see also id. (relevant factors include, inter 
alia, the licensor’s “established polic[ies],” the parties’ actual “commercial 
relationship,” and the nature of the “business proposition” embodied in the 
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hypothetical license); Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709 (permitting consideration of 
“background data” gleaned from expert’s consultations with plaintiff’s principals).  
Fourth, the parties’ own contemporaneous financial projections—including 
SAP’s projections—amply confirm the reasonableness of the jury’s award of $1.3 
billion.  Before acquiring TN, SAP projected that TN’s aggressive discounting 
(enabled by its theft of Oracle’s copyrighted materials), would allow it to persuade 
at least 3,000 PeopleSoft customers—one-third of the total customer base—to 
switch to TN for maintenance services (ER799), and that SAP would be able to 
convert at least 1,375 of those customers into full SAP software purchasers, 
(ER799).  See ER245-46; ER860; ER903 (“Our goal is to convert the majority of 
the” customer base.); ER984 (SAP projecting that by 2009 it would convert 2,000 
to 4,000 PeopleSoft customers to SAP); ER1173.  SAP developed these projections 
with “input and extensive guidance” from its Executive Board (ER1163, ER799), 
in an “attempt[] to make reasonable assumptions” (ER678, ER699-700). 
SAP’s own pre-infringement projections also showed that it earned an 
average of $68,000 per customer per year, plus $358,000 per new customer 
conversion and $86,000 per cross-sold customer (about 70% of which was profit).  
ER412.  Taking these projections together, Oracle expert Meyer calculated10  that, 
                                           
10 Meyer used reasonable discount rates to account for the assumption that 
license fees would have been paid in lump sums in 2005.  ER412-13. 
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SAP could have expected to earn profits of $880 million by 2008 by achieving its 
minimum target of converting just 1,375 of TN’s maintenance customers to its own 
software.  ER410, ER415-16, ER428.11  Indeed, prior to completing the acquisition 
of TN, SAP’s Executive Board approved a business model that valued the benefits 
of acquiring TN as at least $897 million over the first three years alone—with 
substantial benefits continuing well into the future.  ER677-78, ER683, ER699-
700, ER733-36, ER799, ER1173.  
Moreover, contemporaneous financial data shows that Oracle would have 
expected an even larger negative impact on its own business from SAP’s use of the 
PeopleSoft software.  When Oracle made its decision to acquire PeopleSoft and its 
client base, “the key justification to spend $11.1 billion” was its expert-approved 
estimate that each PeopleSoft customer would return an average of $130,000 
annually, 80% of which would be profit.  ER301, ER297-98, ER319-20, ER814-
17, ER426-28.  Taking this estimate together with SAP’s contemporaneous 
customer-conversion projections, Meyer calculated that Oracle would have 
                                           
11 Under more aggressive assumptions, Meyer determined that SAP could 
have reasonably expected to earn more than $1.22 billion if it had captured 2,000 
Oracle customers (ER415-16), and that the total expected value of the converted 
customers (including from cross-sell and up-sell transactions) would have been 
some $2.69 billion (ER415-16).  Other metrics would have given even higher 
estimates of customer value.  For example, the evidence showed that SAP earned 
an average of $1.9 million for each of the four customers that it admits converted 
to SAP as a result of TN.  ER574-76.  At that rate, SAP’s projected customer 
conversions would have earned it between $2.6 billion and $5.7 billion.   
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expected to lose at least $1.386 billion in support revenue from SAP’s use of the 
PeopleSoft copyrighted materials.  ER429.12   
Finally, in addition to a license for the PeopleSoft copyrighted materials, the 
parties also would have negotiated licenses for TN’s separate use of Oracle’s 
Siebel and database software.  Meyer determined that SAP would have expected to 
gain between $97 million and $247 million from its use of the Siebel software, and 
that Oracle would simultaneously have expected to suffer some $164 million in 
negative financial impacts.  ER442-43, ER451.  He thus determined that the Siebel 
license would have been worth at least $100 million.  ER452.  Meyer also 
explained that the licensing fees for the 172 customers found to be using 
unauthorized copies of Oracle’s database software would have cost SAP some 
$55.6 million.  ER462. 
Given this data, a rational jury easily could have found the total value of the 
required licenses to be $1.3 billion.  A reasonable jury, for instance, could have 
determined that the parties would have expected a total minimum revenue swing of 
nearly $2.3 billion from the PeopleSoft materials alone—almost $900 million in 
new profits to SAP in only the first three years, and nearly $1.4 billion in direct 
financial impacts to Oracle.  A reasonable jury likewise could have determined that 
                                           
12    Under more aggressive assumptions, SAP could reasonably have 
expected to earn $1.82 billion or as much as $2.46 billion.  ER429-31. 
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the parties would have met near the middle of that approximation, and agreed on a 
price of about $1.15 billion for a license on the PeopleSoft materials.13  In addition, 
a reasonable jury, following Meyer, could have concluded that SAP would have 
expected to pay some $100 million for the Siebel copyrighted materials, and more 
than $55 million for the database software.  Together, these approximations of the 
license’s value comport with the jury’s finding that SAP would have agreed to 
make a $1.3 billion investment for all three licenses.   
2. The Evidence Supporting The Jury’s $1.3 Billion Award 
Was Objective And Non-Speculative 
The district court was incorrect to find (ER32) the overwhelming evidence 
of hypothetical license damage unduly subjective or speculative.  SAP’s pre-
infringement business projections, Oracle’s arm’s-length transaction modeling, and 
the parties’ contemporaneous profit and revenue projections are all forms of 
evidence well within the bounds of prior decisions in the analogous patent context, 
where the Federal Circuit has repeatedly applied and approved similar analyses 
based on evidence comparable to the specific, contemporaneous data Oracle 
introduced here.  E.g., Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (infringer’s “sales 
expectations at the time when infringement begins” are proper “basis for a royalty 
base”); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 289 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming 
                                           
13   Relying on the middle-of-the-road expected profit and loss scenarios, 
Meyer assessed the value of the hypothetical license fee for the PeopleSoft 
materials at a minimum of $1.5 billion.  ER431. 
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jury’s consideration of internal “document projecting [defendant’s] anticipated 
sale” of infringing products in support of reasonable-royalty damages); TWM Mfg. 
Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming reasonable-
royalty damages based on “pre-infringement internal memorandum” assessing 
defendant’s anticipated profits).  There is no legal basis for declining to apply this 
methodology in the parallel copyright context, and the district court offered none. 
Nor is there reason to conclude that the evidence failed to establish “the 
range of the reasonable market value” or that the jury’s verdict did not fall within 
that range.  Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; see also supra, Part I.B.1.  The jury heard 
substantial expert testimony establishing a range of figures representing reasonable 
valuations of the infringed intellectual property before arriving at a value at the low 
end of that range.  See McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567 (relying on, inter alia, evidence 
of value of copyrighted work to defendant’s business to establish range of its 
market value); cf. Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534 (upholding district court’s calculation of 
damages by halving average of six estimates of fair market value because award 
was “well within the range of the other five estimates”).14   
                                           
14   The specific, contemporaneous evidence of the value of the hypothetical 
license here, which was largely derived from SAP’s own contemporaneous data, 
compares favorably to the patent cases on which SAP relied in support of its 
JMOL motion.  For example, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rejected use of an abstract “rule of thumb” (insufficiently 
tethered to the facts of the case) pursuant to which it was assumed that the licensee 
would pay 25% of its expected profits as a royalty.  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, 
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In all, there was ample evidentiary basis for the jury verdict.  Particularly 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and resolving inferences 
in its favor, as the district court should have, the verdict was a reasonable, 
objective estimate of the value of SAP’s infringement.  The jury’s $1.3 billion 
verdict should be reinstated. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN  
GRANTING SAP A NEW TRIAL LIMITED TO LOST PROFITS 
AND INFRINGER’S PROFITS AND CONDITIONED ON ORACLE’S 
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT REMITTITUR TO $272 MILLION 
A. A New Trial Was Not Warranted Because The Overwhelming 
Weight Of The Evidence Supported The Jury’s Verdict  
Erring under Rule 59 as it had under Rule 50(b), the district court ruled that 
the jury’s “$1.3 billion verdict [was] contrary to the weight of the evidence” so as 
to warrant a new trial   ER38.  According to the court, Oracle’s proof was 
inadequate because it relied primarily on “evidence of the purported value of the 
intellectual property as a whole, … testimony from its executives regarding the 
price they claim they would have demanded in an admittedly fictional negotiation, 
and … the speculative opinion of its damages expert, which was based on little 
                                                                                                                                        
Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009), recognized that parties may rely on 
estimates of a product’s expected usage in determining a lump-sum royalty, but 
concluded that the plaintiff in that case had identified no evidence of such 
estimates.  And in Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions, Inc., 
609 F.3d 1308, 1318-22 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 
594 F.3d 860, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), plaintiffs relied primarily on 
purported benchmark licenses that they could not tie to their own cases. 
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more than guesses about the parties’ expectations.”  Id.  To the extent the court 
ruled that the jury’s award of hypothetical license damages was against the weight 
of the evidence so as to warrant a new trial, its cursory order runs afoul of the rule 
that a court “may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a 
different verdict.”  Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 
F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001); see also S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1225 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (new trial is warranted only where “the verdict is against the great 
weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously 
erroneous result”).  The order should be vacated.15   
First, the “value of the intellectual property as a whole”—an apparent 
reference to Oracle’s evidence of the prices it paid to purchase PeopleSoft and 
Siebel, and to develop its own intellectual property, see D.E.1044 at 7-8—was 
clearly relevant to the fair market value of a hypothetical license.  Those 
contemporaneous purchase prices resulting from arm’s-length negotiations 
provided objective background evidence concerning the “amount [that] would have 
been acceptable by a prudent [copyright holder] who was willing to grant a 
license.”  Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120; see also supra, Part I.B.1.  More 
important, the same model underpinned both Oracle’s decision to pay $11 billion 
                                           
15   To the extent the district court ruled that there was insufficient evidence 
of lost profits and infringers’ profits to support a $1.3 billion verdict, Oracle does 
not contest that ruling.     
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for PeopleSoft and Oracle’s expert’s analysis of the financial impact that Oracle 
would have expected from the loss of exclusive access to the infringed copyrights.  
For example, Meyer valued the hypothetical license using Oracle’s documented 
average support revenue per customer of $130,000, Oracle’s 3.5% expected 
customer attrition rate, and Oracle’s expected profit margin, all taken from the 
same valuation model.  ER426-29.  The fact that Oracle actually based major 
business decisions on those numbers shows that they are not speculative.   
Second, the district court was likewise incorrect in ruling that Oracle 
improperly relied on its executives’ testimony regarding the amount they would 
have demanded for the contemplated license.  The ultimate price of the license was 
but one aspect of their testimony, which focused on objective factors 
demonstrating the importance and value of the copyrighted worked to Oracle’s 
business.  Moreover, testimony as to the amount Oracle executives would demand 
provided a window into what would have transpired at a hypothetical negotiation.  
See Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; supra, Part I.B.1.  The jury, moreover, did not 
impermissibly base its verdict on the amount Oracle “wished [it] had charged,” 
Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534, as evidenced by the fact that the verdict is a small fraction 
of Oracle’s acquisition costs and the amounts its executives said they would have 
demanded.  ER204-05, ER287-89.  
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Third, the district court repeated the same errors that it had committed in 
granting JMOL when it asserted that the financial evidence of the value of a 
hypothetical license was “speculative” and grounded in “little more than guesses 
about the parties’ expectations.”  ER38.  As explained in Part I.B, supra, the $1.3 
billion verdict was supported by substantial, contemporaneous evidence of the 
value both parties would have placed on SAP’s intended use of Oracle’s 
copyrights—not just the value of the acquired companies or the intellectual 
property in the abstract.  Both parties relied on that data in making extraordinarily 
important business decisions—Oracle in spending $11 billion to purchase 
PeopleSoft; SAP in undertaking a plainly illegal course of conduct and exposing 
itself to substantial liability.  The parties would have relied on the same models in 
determining the price for a hypothetical license, and their expectations at the time 
of licensing are the legally salient data point, see McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 566; 
Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1384-85.  Oracle’s expert neither guessed about 
his data nor had any need to do so—he was instead able to rely on SAP’s own 
contemporaneous projections and revenue figures, as well as Oracle’s own 
contemporaneous valuation of its business, all of which were admitted into 
evidence at trial.16    
                                           
16   The jury properly rejected SAP’s competing $40.6 million valuation of a 
hypothetical license, which was based on a “running royalty” model rather than an 
up-front lump sum.  ER526, ER577.  SAP’s expert took into account only the 
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Contrary to the court’s generalized contention that the verdict exceeds what 
the evidence will bear, the jury’s verdict did not exceed the actual harm to Oracle 
and its intellectual property.  The very premise of hypothetical license damages is 
that such an award measures the injury to the value of the subject works, see, e.g., 
Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172, 
and the evidence here established that the value of a license (and thus of the 
misappropriated intellectual property) fell in a range encompassing the jury’s 
verdict.  See supra, Part I.B.1.  The jury’s well-supported verdict should stand. 
B. Even If A New Trial On Damages Were Warranted, It Should 
Have Been Unconditional  
The district court should have granted an unconditional new trial on 
damages at most, even if Oracle’s hypothetical license damages evidence had been 
speculative.  Under Rule 50(b), a district court may order a new trial instead of 
directing entry of judgment as a matter of law, Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 
330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947), where proof of damages is speculative, see, e.g., 
McClaran v. Plastic Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 354, 356-57, 364 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(ordering new damages trial in lieu of JMOL); Whitserve, LLC v. Computer 
                                                                                                                                        
customers that SAP actually succeeded in poaching from Oracle, and the jury 
could reasonably have concluded that hypothetical negotiating parties would have 
based the license fee on the number and kind of copies to be made and the uses to 
which they would be put—rather than what SAP actually wound up achieving 
through its infringement.  See, e.g., Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 775 & n.3; Polar Bear, 
384 F.3d at 709; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385.    
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Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 33-34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. 
City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1998) (same).  The district court 
abused its discretion by not taking the same step. 
This is especially so here because the district court changed the rules after 
the close of proof.  Prior to the JMOL/New Trial Order, the district court had never 
held that hypothetical license damages require proof of actual willingness to 
license or benchmark licenses; to the contrary, the court had rejected both of these 
propositions in its prior rulings.  ER642-43; ER652-54; ER1296-97.  Judgment as 
a matter of law may be granted only “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue,” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), and a “major purpose” of a motion under this rule is “to 
call the claimed deficiency in the evidence to the attention of the court and to 
opposing counsel at a time when the opposing party is still in a position to correct 
the deficit.”  Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation 
omitted).  “In no event … should the court enter judgment against a party who has 
not been apprised of the materiality of the dispositive fact and been afforded an 
opportunity to present any available evidence bearing on that fact.”   FED. R. CIV. 
P. 50 adv. comm. n. (1991), quoted in Waters, 100 F.3d at 1441.  Oracle was not 
“fully heard” because the district court gave it no notice of the evidentiary 
requirements it would ultimately impose.  Accordingly, the proper remedy would 
have been to order an unconditional new trial at which Oracle could present 
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evidence to satisfy any newly imposed evidentiary burden, and any new trial order 
should be modified to allow proof of hypothetical license damages. 
C. At The Very Least, The Remittitur Should Be Increased To 
$408.7 Million   
Even if the district court were correct to enter judgment as a matter of law on 
hypothetical license damages (which it was not), and to limit its new trial order to 
evidence of lost profits and infringer’s profits (which it likewise was not), it still 
abused its discretion in selecting the amount of its remittitur.  A remittitur (if 
given) must be in “the maximum amount sustainable by the proof.”  D&S Redi-
Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982).  
This rule prevents a district court from violating the Seventh Amendment by 
substituting its own judgment for that of the jury.  See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FED. 
PRAC. & PROC. § 2815 & n.19.  Remittitur to an amount below the maximum that 
the evidence can reasonably sustain is thus an error of law and ipso facto an abuse 
of discretion.  See McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1082 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding 
an error of law and thus “a clear abuse of discretion” where “[t]he amounts 
selected by the district court are inconsistent with the maximum recovery rule”); 
see generally Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 
1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion 
when it makes an error of law.”). 
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The district court’s remittitur runs afoul of this rule.  Assuming arguendo 
that hypothetical license damages are unavailable, the “maximum amount” of 
damages supported by the evidence at trial is the $120.7 million in lost profits plus 
$288 million in infringer’s profits ($408.7 million total) that Meyer’s testimony 
established.  ER436-37, ER468-82, ER488-89.  These calculations reasonably 
estimated the ongoing effects of SAP’s infringements until 2015.  Instead of 
accepting this maximum amount, as it was bound to do, the court adopted Meyer’s 
alternative calculations of $36 million in lost profits and $236 million in infringer’s 
profits ($272 million total), under a fictional scenario in which profits and losses 
from SAP’s misappropriation of Oracle’s property suddenly ceased when SAP 
closed TN in 2008.  ER18, ER471, ER489.  While the jury might have been free to 
choose this lesser amount, the district court was not.   
The court’s rationales for rejecting Meyer’s testimony do not withstand even 
minimal scrutiny.  First, the court incorrectly asserted that “Oracle provided no 
evidence to support an additional $84.7 million [in lost profits] for ‘ongoing 
impact’ for seven years following TN’s demise.”  ER40.    As Oracle executives 
testified, absent infringement, Oracle’s customers would typically remain on 
Oracle support for an average of ten years.  ER309 (Oracle co-President and CFO 
describing 10-year customer relationships as “conservative”), ER814-16 
(PeopleSoft valuation describing 10-year relationships).  At the same time, as 
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Meyer testified, the expense and inconvenience of changing service providers 
means that losing a client (or gaining one) is relatively permanent:  “[W]hen a 
customer leaves, it doesn’t come back, you break the service, you lose the 
relationship.”  ER476.  From this common-sense observation, a jury could have 
inferred that even though the infringement ended in 2008, SAP would hold onto 
(and Oracle would continue to be deprived of) the customers SAP had been able to 
lure away on account of its earlier infringement.  There was thus a clear 
evidentiary basis from which a jury might reasonably have concluded that Oracle 
would continue to endure damages after 2008. 
Second, the district court asserted, without support, that “Meyer’s 
justification for the larger calculation of infringer’s profits is unduly speculative.”  
ER40.  But this too is mistaken.  As Meyer explained, his $288 million calculation 
of SAP’s profits from infringement is based on an examination of the 86 
companies that switched from Oracle to SAP during the relevant time period.  See 
ER478-81.  From this group, Meyer determined that twenty of the customers had 
changed service providers for reasons unrelated to TN’s infringement of Oracle’s 
copyrights, but that the other 66 made the switch due to the infringement.  ER472-
76, ER478-81.  Meyer then assessed the particular effects on Oracle and SAP from 
each of these defections, and extrapolated that those effects would continue well 
into the future.  A jury could reasonably agree with this assessment of the effects 
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of SAP’s infringement, and thus could have accepted Meyer’s larger lost-profits 
and infringer’s-profits calculations.  Since the  amount of the remittitur was less 
than the maximum permitted by the evidence (exclusive of hypothetical license 
evidence), the district court abused its discretion. 
III. IN THE EVENT OF ANY REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL, THIS 
COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGAL 
AND EVIDENTIARY  ERRORS 
In the event the Court rejects the above arguments for reinstating the jury 
verdict for Oracle, it should remand for a new trial in which Oracle may seek 
hypothetical license damages, lost profits, and infringer’s profits without the 
strictures imposed by the district court’s evidentiary errors.  The district court 
erroneously limited the evidence that Oracle could present in any second trial, 
while permitting SAP to offer unreliable damages testimony by an unqualified 
expert.  Oracle should be free to prove its damages through proper evidence at any 
new trial. 
A. The District Court Erred In Barring Oracle From Recovering 
Both Actual Damages And Infringer’s Profits  
In denying Oracle’s requested instruction that the jury could award both 
actual damages in the form of hypothetical license damages and infringer’s profits, 
the district court erred and in so doing prejudiced Oracle.  Jury instructions “must 
correctly state the law,” and “[e]ach party is … entitled to an instruction about his 
or her theory of the case if it is supported by law and has foundation in the 
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evidence.”  Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation 
omitted).  “In evaluating jury instructions, prejudicial error results when, looking 
to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly 
and correctly covered.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 
2001)  (quotation omitted). 
Section 504 of the Copyright Act explicitly permits a copyright owner to 
recover both “actual damages” (to compensate it for its loss) and “any profits of 
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account 
in computing the actual damages.”  17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1), 504(b).  The legislative 
history makes clear that Congress intended to permit copyright owners to seek both 
types of awards: 
[S]ection 504(b) recognizes the different purposes served by awards 
of damages and profits.  Damages are awarded to compensate the 
copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are 
awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a 
wrongful act.  … [I]n cases where the copyright owner has suffered 
damages not reflected in the infringer’s profits, or where there have 
been profits attributable to the copyrighted work but not used as a 
measure of damages, subsection (b) authorizes the award of both. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976); see also Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 718 
(similar). 
Consistent with this statutory text and purpose, this Court has held that 
copyright plaintiffs may recover both actual damages and infringer’s profits.  See, 
e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In addition to 
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actual damages suffered, Abend would be entitled to profits attributable to the 
infringement.”); Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 
828 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating, in an appeal of an award of hypothetical license 
damages plus infringer’s profits, that “the copyright owner is entitled to recover 
‘any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not 
taken into account in computing the actual damages’”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
504(b)).  As the Fourth Circuit explained, both actual damages and infringer’s 
profits are awarded so that “the infringer realize[s] that it is cheaper to buy than to 
steal.”  Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1994).  
Contrary to this well-established law, the district court ruled that “the 
hypothetical license does include the infringer’s profits regardless of what 
[damages] number the jury comes back with.”  ER634.  But, as Oracle explained, 
if the jury awarded hypothetical license damages below the amount proffered by 
Oracle’s expert Meyer (i.e., below $1.656 billion (ER463)), the jury would have to 
determine whether that hypothetical license value included all of the infringer’s 
profits.  ER632-33.  Without the requested instruction (ER1208), the jury never 
had the opportunity to make this determination.  The failure to give the legally 
correct jury instruction was prejudicial because it would permit the jury to award 
only an amount of actual damages that did not include all infringer’s profits.  This 
error should be corrected before any new trial.    
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B. The District Court Improperly Excluded Evidence Of SAP’s 
Saved Research And Development Costs 
The district court also erred in ruling on SAP’s motion for partial summary 
judgment that hypothetical license damages could not take into account the billions 
of dollars in research and development costs that SAP would have had to incur 
absent its infringement of Oracle’s intellectual property.  ER93-94.  That ruling 
was erroneous as a matter of law, because the savings a buyer would achieve from 
not having to develop a product are relevant to determine the fair market value of a 
hypothetical license for that product. 
This Court has long recognized an objective “value of use” measure of 
actual copyright damages.  Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708; 
Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479.  Saved development costs are part of the value of 
infringement and thus should be included in quantifying the fair market value.  See 
Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708 (including as damages “the value of the use of the 
copyrighted work to the infringer”) (quotation omitted).  There is no basis to 
exclude such evidence categorically and other courts have found such evidence 
relevant.  Harris Market Research v. Marshall Mkting. & Comm’cns, Inc. 948 F.2d 
1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing consideration of copyright-holder’s 
development costs in determining hypothetical license); Real View, LLC. v. 20-20 
Techns., Inc. 811 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558-59 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting instruction that 
jury “could take into account ‘any design costs that [the infringer] saved by its use 
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of ... [copyrighted material]’”); cf. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 
709-10 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming award of saved development costs under unjust 
enrichment theory where defendant had misappropriated trade secrets). 
The district court initially accepted this “value of use” approach (ER1295), 
but later ruled to the contrary (ER93-94).  This ruling was inconsistent with the 
authorities above and should be vacated in advance of any new trial.  
C. The District Court Improperly Held Admissible SAP’s Evidence 
Of Overhead Expenses For Purposes Of Calculating Infringer’s 
Profits 
The district court also erred as a matter of law in denying Oracle’s motion in 
limine, directed to the second trial, to preclude SAP from offering evidence of its 
overhead expenses in an effort to lower its infringer’s profits.  ER13-14.  This error 
too should be corrected in advance of any retrial. 
Section 504(b) permits a copyright defendant to introduce evidence of 
“deductible expenses” to be offset against gross revenues, so as to reach a figure 
for “profits of the infringer.”  17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  The Copyright Act, however, 
does not define “deductible expenses,” and courts, including this Court, have filled 
this gap by precluding willful infringers from deducting overhead costs.   See, e.g., 
Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 515 (“A portion of an infringer’s overhead properly may 
be deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits, at least where the 
infringement was not willful, conscious, or deliberate.”) (emphasis added); Saxon 
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v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Overhead may not be deducted from 
gross revenues to arrive at profits when an infringement was deliberate or 
willful.”); cf. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 99-100 
(1928) (holding that willful infringers could not deduct income taxes), cited in 
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2000).  This rule 
ensures that there is an adequate disincentive to infringe, as mere disgorgement of 
profits—with deductions available for the cost of infringement—offers little to 
dissuade a willful infringer who is necessarily taking a calculated risk. 
Here, TN pled guilty to criminal copyright infringement following the first 
trial.  In the plea, TN conceded that it “willfully infringed the copyrights of 
Oracle’s copyrighted works … for the purpose of commercial advantage and 
private financial gain.”  United States v. TomorrowNow, Inc., No. 4:11-cr-642, 
Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 13, at 5:13-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011).  In the civil 
case, SAP AG and SAP America stipulated that they “intentionally materially 
contributed” to TN’s willful infringement.  ER507.   In light of these admissions, 
the district court should have precluded SAP from deducting overhead expenses 
when calculating lost profits.   
In denying Oracle’s motion, the district court relied on the absence of any 
distinction between willful and non-willful infringers in Section 504(b), in contrast 
to Section 504(c), which does distinguish between willful and non-willful 
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infringers for caps on statutory damages.  ER13-14.  But Section 504(c) employs a 
different scheme for the calculation of statutory damages than exists in Section 
504(b) for the calculation of actual damages, and thus the reference to willful 
infringers in Section 504(c), but not Section 504(b), sheds little light on 
congressional intent.  If anything, the higher cap on statutory damages for willful 
infringers than non-willful infringers in Section 504(c) suggests that differences in 
culpability should affect the extent to which deductions are available under Section 
504(b) to ensure adequate deterrence.  Thus, in any new trial, SAP should be 
precluded from deducting overhead expenses when calculating infringer’s profits. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Permitting Testimony 
By SAP’s Damages Expert Clarke  
SAP’s expert, Stephen Clarke, was not qualified to testify on the topics as to 
which he opined, and his testimony was unreliable; the district court thus should 
have excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires consideration 
of whether the expert has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education on the subject matter, and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993), which requires determination “whether the reasoning 
or methodology underlying [expert] testimony is scientifically valid and … 
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in 
issue.”  Expert opinions “are to be admitted only if the facts or data are of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
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inferences upon the subject.”  Id. at 595 (internal quotations omitted).  
“[M]aintaining Daubert’s standards is particularly important considering the aura 
of authority experts often exude, which can lead juries to give more weight to their 
testimony.”  Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (9th 
Cir. 2002).  
1. Clarke’s Consumer Behavior Testimony Was Unreliable 
And Outside His Expertise 
Over Oracle’s objection (D.E.781; D.E.1145; ER62), the district court—
without making an express determination about expert qualifications or 
reliability—improperly admitted Clarke’s testimony regarding consumer behavior 
as to which he lacked any expertise (ER12, ER63-65, ER69).  Clarke testified that 
he looked at consumer information to determine why customers left Oracle and 
excluded from his analysis of lost profits and infringer’s profits consumers who 
purportedly left for reasons other than switching to TN.  ER59.  Clarke’s consumer 
behavior opinion removed 63 customers from his lost profits analysis, and 82 of 86 
customers from his analysis of SAP’s infringer’s profits.  ER546-47, ER565.  With 
respect to infringer’s profits, this represented hundreds of millions of dollars of 
revenue.  ER576 (Clarke subtracting $675 million in infringer’s profits). 
Clarke, however, is unqualified to provide any testimony about how 
customers made purchasing decisions.  He has no experience, knowledge, training, 
or expertise in consumer behavior or any related field.  Rather, Clarke’s only 
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training and experience is in accounting.  ER538-40.  Because his testimony 
sought to explain why customers acted as they did, he needed expertise in 
consumer behavior that he lacked.  See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 
875 F.2d 564, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony 
about consumer reaction to sales pitch because such testimony required expert in 
consumer psychology or consumer behavior).  
Clarke’s ad hoc “methodology” for excluding certain customers also was 
unreliable, providing an independent basis for excluding the testimony.  Clarke 
admitted that he “toyed with all kinds of ways of doing this, trying to make an 
appropriate judgment as to whether these customers would have left” (ER572), 
apparently developing his “method” for the sole purpose of testifying in this case  
(ER564-68).  The absence of any discernible, testable methodology, particularly 
one that was developed prior to the litigation, is a “very significant fact” that 
weighs against the reliability of expert testimony.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharms, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). 
The district court thus abused its discretion in admitting this consumer 
behavior opinion, which substantially decreased Clarke’s computation of lost 
profits and infringer’s profits.  SAP should be precluded from offering this 
testimony in a second trial.   
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2. Clarke’s Market Study Testimony Was Unreliable And 
Outside His Expertise 
Over Oracle’s objection (D.E.781; D.E.1145; ER58), the district court also 
improperly admitted Clarke’s testimony regarding “market studies.”  Clarke 
opined that TN customers would have left Oracle even if TN had not existed and 
that competition from other companies would have reduced the fair market value 
of a hypothetical license below the amount proffered by Oracle’s expert.  ER584-
86.   
Not only was Clarke unqualified to opine on market alternatives (given his 
background is limited to accounting), his opinion was based solely on Internet 
research, not any reliable methodology.  Clarke merely examined website 
marketing materials (ER587), and did so without determining the accuracy of that 
information (ER588).  He then used that information to evaluate whether 
companies in the same field would be viable competitors for PeopleSoft customers 
seeking support, a matter also beyond Clarke’s expertise.   ER555-57.  He was also 
unable to explain how he evaluated the market at the time of hypothetical license 
negotiations in 2005, rather than when he prepared his expert report years later.  
ER590. 
Clarke’s Internet research reflects none of the hallmarks of a scientific and 
verifiable method necessary to satisfy the Daubert standard.  See, e.g., Kilgore v. 
Carson Pirie Holdings, Inc., 205 Fed. App’x 367, 372 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming 
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exclusion of expert opinion based on internet article and personal experience “was 
not supported by sufficient data or reliable methodology”); Trademark Props., Inc. 
v. A & E Television Networks, 2008 WL 4811461, *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2008) 
(excluding expert damages opinion that relied on a newspaper article and internet 
research); In re Ameriserve Food Distrib., Inc., 267 B.R. 668, 672 (D. Del. 2001) 
(“It cannot be said that internet and library research, such as here, is the type 
‘experts’ customarily rely upon in forming legitimate opinions.”). 
The district court thus abused its discretion in admitting such testimony, and 
that error should be corrected in advance of any second trial.   
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded with directions to 
enter judgment in favor of Oracle in the amount of $1.3 billion.   Alternatively, the 
judgment should be vacated and the case remanded either  (1) for a new trial on 
hypothetical license damages, lost profits, and infringer’s profits, free from the 
district court’s evidentiary errors, or (2) so that Oracle may consider whether to 
accept a remittitur in the amount of $408.7 million or a new trial on lost profits and 
infringer’s profits, again free from the district court’s evidentiary errors. 
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees respectfully request that this Court 
hear oral argument in this case. 
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-2.6, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees 
state that they are not aware of any related cases pending in this Court.   
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